Who\u27s Checking?: Taking a Look at Recently Enacted Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Laws in the United States and Zimbabwe and Their Impact on the Separation of Powers by O\u27Connell, Andrew M.
WHO'S CHECKING?: TAKING A LOOK AT RECENTLY ENACTED
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ZIMBABWE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Andrew M O'Connell*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 556
II. BACKGROUND: EVENTS LEADING TO THE FISA AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2008 (FAA) AND THE INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS ACT (ICA) ............................. 559
A. The United States .................................... 559
B. Zim babwe .......................................... 564
C. Constitutional History and Structure of the United States ..... 570
D. Constitutional History and Structure of Zimbabwe .......... 571
II. THE FAA AND THE ICA .................................. 573
A. The Basics of the FAA and the ICA ...................... 573
B. Common Characteristics of the FAA and ICA that
Limit the Surveillance Power ........................... 576
C. Common Shortcomings of the FAA and ICA ............... 577
D. Limits Placed on the Surveillance Power Through
Judicial and Legislative Checks and Balances .............. 579
1. Judicial Checks in the FAA and ICA ................... 579
2. Legislative Checks in the FAA and ICA ................ 580
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE ............................ 582
A. Zimbabwe .......................................... 582
B. The United States .................................... 584
V . CONCLUSION ........................................... 586
* J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of Georgia, 2005. I
would like to thank the editors of the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law
for their excellent work. Special thanks to my family and my fianc~e, Erin Murray, for their love
and encouragement.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. INTRODUCTION
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and
whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'
A lot more information is going to pass through government
hands, and most of that is going to be about people who turn out
to be innocent or irrelevant.2
The terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 prompted swift responses from
the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States government. On
September 18, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF), which gives the President the authority "to use
all necessary and appropriate force" against any country or person who was
involved in the terrorist attacks.3 Two days later in a speech before a joint
session of Congress, the President declared that the United States was engaged
in a struggle against international terrorism and informed the country of his
intention to confront Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.4 In October 2002, Congress
further authorized the President to "defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,"5 which led to the invasion
of Iraq in March 2003.6
The resolutions authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq were
not the only resources the Executive Branch was given by the Legislative
Branch to engage in the new War on Terror. On October 26, 2001, just forty-
three days after the attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act) was
signed into law by President Bush.7 The PATRIOT Act expanded the
THiE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 261 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
2 Richard B. Schmitt, Spying Up, but Terror Cases Drop, L.A. TIMEs, May 12, 2008, at 1
(quoting Michael Woods, former head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation security law unit).
' Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4 147 CONG. REc. S9553-04 (Sept. 20, 2001) (statement of President Bush).
' Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243, § 3(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
6 David E. Sanger & John F. Bums, Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently
Miss Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at Al.
' Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Executive's authority to collect material relating to foreign intelligence
information and expanded the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA) to include suspected terrorists.8
In the summer of 2007, Congress granted the Executive Branch additional
authority to engage in the War on Terror by its passage of the Protect America
Act of 2007 (PAA). 9 After some controversy over the renewal of the PAA and
its temporary lapse, Congress enacted and President Bush signed into law the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), which broadened the Executive
Branch's wiretapping capabilities.'" The expansion of Executive power in the
field of national security surveillance in the United States can be analyzed in
conjunction with the recent history of Zimbabwe, where a similar chain of
events has been unfolding.
On August 3, 2007, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe signed the
Interception of Communications Act (ICA) into law." The new law empowers
the Executive Branch of Zimbabwe to intercept communications "concerning
an actual threat to the national security" of Zimbabwe. 12 Its passage continues
a long series of oppressive measures initiated by the Executive Branch of
Zimbabwe and acceded to by Parliament since 2000.13 However, the impetus
for Zimbabwe's changes in its foreign intelligence surveillance laws was not
the threat of international terrorism but growing economic insecurity, which
many critics believe is the result of extreme land ownership reforms initiated
by the Executive Branch of Zimbabwe's government. 4 In 2000, President
8 Id. §§ 207, 214, 225,412.
9 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007) (to be codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1805).
10 Eric Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2008, at Al. The PATRIOT Act was renewed in March 2006. Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Senate Passes Legislation to Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A14.
" Terrorism, Communications Bills Now Law, HERALD (Harare, Zimbabwe), Aug. 4, 2007,
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200708040075.html. Allafrica.com requires a subscription.
Copies of material cited to in the Note from this source are also on file with the author.
12 Interception of Communications Act, pt. III, § 6(1)(b) (2007) (Zimb.), available at http://
kubatana.net/docs/legisl/ica070803.pdf.
" See Michael Wines, Allies Not Likely to Push Mugabe to Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2007, at A12 (noting comments from other African leaders comparing Zimbabwe to
a "sinking Titanic" and demanding Mugabe "to restore political and economic freedoms...");
see also CRAIG RICHARDSON, THE COLLAPSE OF ZIMBABWE IN THE WAKE OF THE 2000-2003
LAND REFORMS 3-4 (2004) (arguing that Zimbabwe's economic woes can be traced to land
reform and government interference in the economy).
14 See, e.g., Craig Richardson, How the Loss of Property Rights Caused Zimbabwe's
Collapse, CATO INST. ECON. DEV. BULL., Nov. 14, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter CATO], http://www.
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Mugabe authorized the seizure of almost all of the 4,500 commercial farms
privately owned by whites with the intent of redistributing the land to black
farmers who primarily farmed on small, communal lots that had existed prior
to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980."5 Since Mugabe's controversial
decision in 2000,6 which coincided with-and many critics argue has
caused-rapid and unprecedented economic decline, 7 the Zimbabwean
Parliament has reacted to the economic crisis by giving greater power to the
Executive Branch to engage in electronic surveillance.
On its face, a comparison of the United States and Zimbabwe may seem
attenuated, given their disparate political histories and relative statures in the
world. 8 However, the Legislative Branches in both nations have reacted to
recent crises in strikingly similar ways by enacting surveillance laws that
increase executive power with limited judicial and legislative checks on that
power.' 9 Part II of this Note discusses the events in the United States and
Zimbabwe that led to the enactment of the FAA and the ICA, focusing on
recent developments in the two nations that have given rise to the new
Executive Branch claims for more power. It also compares and contrasts the
constitutional structures of the countries to show how their respective
constitutions attempt to protect the rule of law through the principle of the
separation of powers. Part Ill analyzes the two newest surveillance laws, the
FAA and the ICA, by looking at the different mechanisms that they have
included, or failed to include, in an attempt to maintain balance through the
separation of powers among the branches of government. While both the FAA
and ICA have common shortcomings, the FAA is preferable to the ICA
through its placement of limited judicial and legislative checks on the
Executive. Part IV looks at possibilities for the future of each country and
offers suggestions for a way forward that will protect the separation of powers
and civil liberties.
cato.org/pubs/edb/edb4.pdf (discussing Mugabe's land reforms and Zimbabwe's economic
collapse).
15 Id. at 1-2.
6 d. at 1.
'7 See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (scholar Craig Richardson analyzing Zimbabwe's land reforms and
economic downturn).
11 See infra Parts II.C, ILD (discussing the constitutional histories and political structures
of the United States and Zimbabwe).
'9 See infra Part III (discussing and analyzing these government surveillance laws).
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HI. BACKGROUND: EVENTS LEADING TO THE FISA AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2008 (FAA) AND THE INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS ACT (ICA)
A. The United States
On September 18, 2001, one week after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, President Bush signed the AUMF into law.2" The
AUMF gives the Executive Branch broad powers to prosecute the War on
Terror: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001."21 Despite the broad authorization in the AUMF, the
Justice Department pressed for greater legal authority to conduct clandestine
international surveillance activities, which resulted in the passage of the
PATRIOT Act less than two months after September I L" The limited
congressional debate regarding the expansive new eavesdropping powers that
Congress was conferring upon the Executive Branch was startling.23 Congress'
lack of interest in legislative vetting and its surrender to the exigency of the
moment was showcased by the comments of the then-Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), who
said, "The attorney general has been quite plain that as soon as the president
20 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
21 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
22 See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, But
With Five- Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6 (stating in reference to the PATRIOT
Act: "The Legislation, produced in response to Attorney General John Ashcroft's demand for
immediate action, would give the government new powers to monitor e-mail among terrorism
suspects and, with a single warrant, wiretap any phones a suspect might use."). Three hundred
fifty-seven members of the House voted in favor of the PATRIOT Act, sixty-six voted against
it, and nine missed the vote. U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk, Final Vote
Results for Roll Call 398, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/ro1398.xml (last visited
May 29, 2009) (showing that a majority of Democrats in the House, 145 out of 211, voted for
the bill). In the Senate, only one out of ninety-nine voting Senators opposed the bill. United
States Senate, Legislation and Records, Roll Call Vote 313, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfiitcfin?congress=l107&session=1&vote=00313 (last visited
May 29, 2009) (showing the lone dissenter to be Democratic Senator Russ Feingold from
Wisconsin).
23 See Toner & Lewis, supra note 22, at B6 (referring to "little debate" in the House and
Senate prior to the bill's passage).
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signs the bill, law enforcement will begin using these new powers."" He
continued, "Time is of the essence in light of the increased threat the F.B.I. has
announced against the United States and its citizens."25 The new powers given
to the Executive Branch in the PATRIOT Act have been discussed by many
commentators,26 but for the purposes of this Note, it is important to look at the
PATRIOT Act in the context of the law that it expanded and significantly
altered, FISA.
FISA was passed in response to the Watergate scandal and the
investigations of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee),
which revealed the pervasiveness of government-conducted electronic
eavesdropping on domestic targets that had occurred in the United States since
World War 11.27 In 1968 Congress passed a law, Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III), which regulated domestic
28
electronic eavesdropping. However, many of the surveillance activities
uncovered by the Church Committee had been aimed at domestic targets and
conducted in the name of "national security" to avoid the strictures of Title
ni1.29
In addition to the statutory framework of Title III for domestic
eavesdropping, FISA was enacted against the constitutional backdrop of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Heather Hillary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of the PA TRIOTAct:
A Primer, 8 J.L. SOC'Y 1 (2007) (discussing problematic aspects of the PATRIOT Act with
citation to many other journalistic pieces and scholarly works on the subject).
27 WilliamC. Banks, TheDeath ofFISA,91 MINN.L.REv. 1209,1225-28. The author cites
extensive Congressional findings to illustrate the extent of government surveillance of domestic
targets, including the fact that approximately 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA
computer system during a six year clandestine operation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id
at 1226.
2 Caitlin Thistle, Comment, A First Amendment Breach: The National Security Agency's
Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SEToN HALL L. REv. 1197, 1200 (2008).
29 Id. at 1200-01.
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.3"
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, FISA required the collection of foreign intelligence
information to be the "primary purpose" of any surveillance undertaken by the
Executive in the name of national security.3 FISA created a top secret court,
the FISA court, composed of federal judges, to review warrant applications
submitted by the government under the "primary purpose" standard of the
statute.32 The PATRIOT Act, in an effort to encourage information sharing
among law enforcement and intelligence organizations in the federal
government, lowered the standard to a "significant" purpose.33 A subsequent
FISA appellate court decision interpreting the new language "practically
eliminate[d] any requirement that the government show a foreign intelligence
purpose in its FISA applications,"34 opening the door for increased
surveillance.
FISA defines "foreign intelligence information" as:
(1) [I]nformation that relates to, and if concerning a United
States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to
protect against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence
service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a
foreign power; or
(2) [I]nformation with respect to a foreign power or foreign
territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person
is necessary to-
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3l Banks, supra note 27, at 1241.
32 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2008); see also Banks, supra note 27, at 1231-32 (stating that "FISA
authorizes a special court... that meets in secret, ex parte" and explaining certain aspects of the
FISA court).
13 Banks, supra note 27, at 1243-45.
4 Id. at 1246; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732-35 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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(A) the national defense or the security of the United
States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.35
The original FISA statute also contained a fairly expansive definition of the
kinds of "electronic surveillance" that would be regulated by the law and
included: (1) communications "sent by or intended to be received by" an
ascertainable United States person who is located within the United States; (2)
communications "to or from a person in the United States ... if such
acquisition occurs in the United States"; (3) communications between any
people located within the United States "under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes"; (4) the use of a surveillance device
within the United States "under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes. ' '36 To conduct surveillance of any of these
communications, the government must apply for and receive a warrant from
the FISA court."
In spite of the powers granted by FISA, the Bush Administration engaged
in an extensive Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), in which the National
Security Agency (NSA) eavesdropped on the communications of Americans
without judicial oversight and wholly without legislative approval.38 The
program monitored communications made by persons inside the United States
to persons outside the United States.39 Instead of revising FISA, or having this
change included in the PATRIOT Act, the administration chose to act outside
the law. The Bush Administration has argued that the AUMF gave it the
authority to engage in the TSP because FISA only criminally punishes anyone
who engages in surveillance "not authorized by statute," a claim which is not
supported by the plain language of FISA itself.4"
35 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2006).
36 Id. § 1801(f)(1)-(4).
31 Id. § 1805; see also Banks, supra note 27, at 1231-32 (describing this process).
31 See Banks, supra note 27, at 1254 (noting President Bush's secret authorization of these
activities and the lack of judicial approval).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1255. The text and legislative history of the statute reveals that the "statute" referred
to in FISA is FISA itself, however, not another federal statute like the AUMF. Id.
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After the New York Times broke the story of the TSP in December 2005,4'
the Bush Administration was faced with the threat of litigation over the TSP
and the possibility of a court shutting the program down. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the NSA in federal district court in Michigan
and won, with the court finding that the TSP violated the constitutional rights
of the plaintiffs.42 In a ruling that did not reach the merits of the
constitutionality or legality of the TSP, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for a lack of jurisdiction.43
In January 2007, the FISA court issued a ruling that allowed the Bush
Administration to continue the NSA wiretapping program under the FISA
guidelines.' However, a May 2007 ruling by the FISA court held that some
purely international communications (electronic communications between two
persons located in countries other than the United States) that were transmitted
through communications facilities located within the United States required
FISA warrants.
45
Faced with these judicial challenges to the allegedly illegal program, the
Bush Administration went to Congress to get a new law that would make the
TSP legal.46 The bill, the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA),47 was proposed
by Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on July 27,2007, and
the Bush Administration pressured Congress to pass the law. 48  The
Administration used the impending congressional summer recess to heighten
the sense of urgency surrounding the passage of the law.49 In his weekly radio
41 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 16,2005, at Al (reporting that "[m]onths after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush
secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside
the United States").
42 ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
4 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 644, 720 (6th Cir. 2007).
" Eric Lichtblau, James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, Reported Drop in Surveillance Spurreda
Law, N.Y. TJMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at AI; see also Charlie Savage, New Law Expands Power to
Wiretap-Diminishes Oversight of NSA Spy Program, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2007, at 1A
(reporting that "[i]n January 2007, [Attorney General] Gonzales announced that the program had
been brought under the oversight of the national security court").
"' Lichtblau, Risen & Mazzetti, supra note 44; see also James Risen, Surveillance Court
Declines to Release Secret Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at A32 (reporting that the
subsequent FISA Court decision was handed down in May).
"Ellen Nakashima, A Push to Rewrite Wiretap Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at A04.
41 See Juan P. Valdivieso, Recent Developments, Protect America Act of 2007, 45 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 581, 587 (2008) (discussing the legislative history of the PAA).
48 Id.
41 See Nakashima, supra note 46 (reporting that "The [Bush] [A]dministration ... ha[s]
2009]
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address, the President invoked the specter of the 9/11 attacks, cautioning
Americans that the same terrorists who attacked on that day still wanted to
strike the United States.50 The tactics worked, as the Democratic-controlled
House and Senate passed the bill before the August recess, fearing that if they
did not, the President and other Republicans would depict the Democrats as
"weak on terrorism."5'
The PAA became an immediate lightning rod of controversy, both because
of its grant of expansive new eavesdropping power to the Executive Branch
52
and Congress's quick submission to the demands of the Executive.53 In a rare
show of defiance to the White House, Congress refused to extend the PAA
when it expired in early 2008."4 However, as the first batch of surveillance
orders issued under the PAA neared expiration in August 2008, and fearing
once again that they would be considered soft on terrorism, this time in an
election year, the Democratic-controlled Congress passed the FAA in early
July 2008."5 At the same time this chain of events was unfolding in the United
States, Zimbabwe was also making similar changes to its foreign intelligence-
gathering laws.
B. Zimbabwe
The Republic of Zimbabwe became an independent country on
April 18, 1980,56 after almost one hundred years of colonial rule by the
British.57 Colonial Zimbabwe was governed by several different constitutional
mounted a full-court press to get the Democratic-controlled Congress to pass the measure before
lawmakers leave town... for the August recess, trying to portray reluctant Democrats as weak
on terrorism").
50 Id.
"' James Risen, Democrats Scrambling to ExpandEavesdropping, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1 2007,
at A12; see also Nakashima, supra note 46 (referring to pressure from the Bush administration
on the Democratic-controlled Congress).
52 See Valdivieso, supra note 47, at 581 (reporting that "[c]ivil liberties groups... were
quick to criticize the PAA").
" See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Concerns Raised on Wider Spying Under New
Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2007, at Al (discussing how the bill was passed "in a frenetic, end
of session scramble").
s Carl Hulse, House Leaves Surveillance Law to Expire, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15,2008,atAl7.
" Lichtblau, supra note 10, at Al (stating "many Democrats were wary of handing the
Republicans a potent political weapon").
56 JACOB CHIKUHWA, A CRIsIs OF GOVERNANCE: ZIMBABWE 1, 33 (2004).
s' See generally id. at 1-33 (discussing the pre-colonial and colonial history of the Shona
kingdom and British control of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) beginning in 1890).
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schemes, and in 1965, political unrest caused a nationalist group to unilaterally
declare independence from the United Kingdom, touching off four years of
fighting and political negotiations.5" The current Lancaster House Constitution
was modeled on the British parliamentary system, with a bicameral legislature
consisting of a House of Assembly and a Senate, and an executive branch
headed by a ceremonial President,59 who appointed the majority leader of
Parliament as his Prime Minister.60
The one hundred-member House of Assembly initially had twenty seats
reserved to be specially elected in a white-only vote, while the other eighty
seats were popularly elected by the rest of the population.6' The Senate was
composed of forty members, fourteen of whom were elected by the eighty
popularly elected members of the House of Assembly, ten of whom were
elected by the twenty white-only-elected members of the House of Assembly,
ten of whom were elected by the Council of Chiefs, and six of whom were
appointed by the President. 62 The Council of Chiefs, or some variation of it,
had existed since the 1920s, and consisted of the indigenous tribal chiefs who
continued to exercise some traditional authority in the settlement of disputes
and to act as a channel for native Zimbabweans to express themselves to the
white colonial government.63
In addition to the descendants of white settlers, who constituted a small
minority but held political and economic power disparate to their numbers,6'
two competing native African factions battled for control of the young
republic: the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF)
51 See id. at 16-25 (discussing the 1923, 1961, 1965, and 1969 Constitutions; Unilateral
Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian Front Government in November 1965; the
subsequent "war between the Rhodesia Front Government and the nationalist forces (freedom
fighters)"; approval of Rhodesian constitutional proposals in 1969; and, finally, the declaration
of a republic in 1970).
59 Id. at 32-35.
6 See id. at 35 (stating "[t]he President appointed as Prime Minister the person who, in his
opinion, was best able to command the support of the majority of members of the House of
Assembly").
61 PIERRE Du TorT, STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: BOTSWANA,
ZIMBABWE, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 120 (1995).
62 Id.
63 See id. at 87-88 (discussing the "legal incorporation of the chiefs" as well as "their
traditional authority" and efforts to convey the sentiments of "their people" to the state).
61 See CHIKuHWA, supra note 56, at 36 (referring to the "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
government... representing white interests" and the "20 [out of one hundred] seats... reserved
for the white minority...").
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and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).65 The first election
in 1980 produced a large majority for the ZANU-PF, as it won fifty-seven of
the eighty seats in the House of Assembly." In subsequent elections, the
ZANU-PF increased its majority, culminating with the merger of ZANU-PF
and ZAPU in 1990 to control 116 of the 120 seats.67
The leader of ZANU-PF, Robert Mugabe, had succeeded in his goal of
making Zimbabwe a one-party state.68 In 1987, Mugabe pushed through
constitutional amendments that made the ceremonial president into a true
executive69 elected to five-year terms.7 °
Land reform was always a central feature of Mugabe's political platform.7'
Zimbabwe benefited from a thriving economic farming base due to an
extensive number of dams and rich soil.72  But there was a sharp racial
disparity in land ownership, as the most profitable, large-scale commercial
farms were concentrated in the hands of fewer than 5,000 white families, while
more than 800,000 black farmers continued to till communal lands that were
a vestige of colonialism. 73 After his party received ninety-six percent of the
vote in 1996, an election in which only thirty-two percent of eligible voters
participated74 due to growing cynicism about the legitimacy of the government,
Mugabe proceeded to initiate some land reforms policies to benefit himself and
other powerful individuals; for instance, one large tract was split it into twenty-
seven smaller parcels, which were then doled out to political allies.75
By 2000, the policies of Mugabe had created a widespread desire for
change and fomented political opposition, embodied in the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), led by Morgan Tsvangirai, which opposed the
65 Id.
66 Du TOIT, supra note 61, at 137.
67 Id.; see also CHIKUHWA, supra note 56, at 40 (discussing legislation that abolished the
Senate and increased the size of the House of Assembly to 150 members).68 See RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 33-34 (discussing ZANU-PF's achievement of its goal
of consolidating state power by becoming "the dominant and usually unchallenged party").
69 Id. at 35-36.
70 Id. at 44.
71 See generally id. at 35-42 (discussing Mugabe's focus on land reform).
72 See CATO, supra note 14, at 1-2 (detailing that although Zimbabwe only occupies seven
percent of the land in Southern Africa, 10,747 of the 12,430 dams in the region are located
within its borders).
13 Id. at 1.
14 African Elections Database, Elections in Zimbabwe, http://africanelections.tripod.com/
zw.html (last visited May 29, 2009) (scroll down and follow "1996" hyperlink).
71 RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 38-39.
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ZANU-PF and Mugabe in the April 2000 presidential election.76 The MDC
garnered forty-seven percent of the vote to ZANU-PF's forty-eight percent, in
spite of alleged widespread fraud at the polls.77 This close call may have come
as a surprise to Mugabe, as he had hoped to consolidate his power before the
elections by instituting a dramatic set of land reforms that seized white-owned
farmers and gave them to black farmers and passively permitted occupation of
white farms by blacks.7" The forced transfer of property has had a disastrous
effect on the national economy, as agricultural production has plummeted due
to drought and extremely productive commercial farms are transformed into
small-scale communally farmed plots that are overworked and less able to
withstand the devastating effects of the drought.79
The economic downturn and Mugabe's increasing age and political
isolation have coincided with the enactment of draconian government
programs. In 2000, the government enacted the Post and Telecommunications
Act, which allowed the Executive Branch to monitor and collect Internet and
phone communications made within Zimbabwe. ° The law allowed the
government to monitor communications if it determined that the surveillance
was "reasonably justified."'" However, in a landmark ruling in 2004, the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court declared that the law's standard of reasonable
justification violated the Zimbabwe Constitution's guarantees of individual
freedom.82 Section 20 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression
subject to restrictions enacted in the interest of"defen[s]e, public safety, public
order [and] the economic interests of the [s]tate." 3
76 Id. at 39.
77 Elections in Zimbabwe, supra note 74; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 39
(discussing perceived fraud surrounding democratic processes).
78 CHIKUHWA, supra note 56, at 249-50.
79 RICHARDSON, supra note 13, at 75-84; see also id. at 76, tbl.4.3 (comparing differences
in the yield and production on communal and commercial farms).
" UNHCR, Refworld, Internet Under Surveillance 2004- Zimbabwe, http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/46e6919bc.html (last visited May 29, 2009).
81 Id.
82 See id. (discussing the court's ruling that certain sections of the PTA were unconstitutional
and that the "reasonably justified" standard "was too vague to guarantee individual freedoms").
83 CoNsTrITUToN OF ZIMBABWE ch. III, § 20(2)(a) [hereinafter ZIMB. CONST.]. The
Constitution of Zimbabwe changes almost yearly, and at the time of publication of this Note, the
version referred to is available athttp://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/constitution-zim070201.
pdf.
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After another close call in the presidential election of 2002," Mugabe and
the ZANU-PF Parliament enacted laws that sharply curbed the freedom of the
press and threatened dissident groups with jail if they continued to oppose his
regime.85 In 2004, the government began monitoring internet activity and
prohibiting cell phone operators from transmitting international calls.86
Thus, the press and the MDC had been aware of the Mugabe regime's
intention to chill speech for quite some time prior to the introduction and
passage of the ICA. After knowledge of the proposed bill first became public
in March 2006, the business sector that would be most affected by the bill,
internet service providers, promptly came out against it, detailing the damage
that it would do to their businesses in Zimbabwe.87 By May, the bill was being
condemned by civil rights groups for giving the government the potential to
place an "iron grip" on communications in the country.88
The proposed measure also met a roadblock in Parliament. Before any bill
can go before the full Parliament, it has to pass through the Parliamentary
Legal Committee (PLC).89 The PLC is a committee in Parliament established
by the constitution to review the constitutionality of most bills that are
submitted to Parliament.9° The constitution further requires that the PLC be
composed of members of Parliament, the majority of whom must have judicial
experience or legal training.9
In August, a consortium of media groups organized to submit their
objections to the PLC, detailing the potential unconstitutionality of the bill and
objecting to the lack of judicial oversight.92 In November, faced with
" See African Elections Database, supra note 74 (scroll down and follow "2002" hyperlink)
(showing that Mugabe received fifty-six percent of the vote to Tsvangirai's forty-two percent).
85 See Michael Wines, Zimbabwe Extends Crackdown on Dissent as Election Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al (describing several new laws restricting freedoms of speech and
assembly that are enforced upon threat of imprisonment).
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Jim Holland, Interception of Communications Bill 2006: An ISP's Perspective,
KUBATANA, Apr. 13,2006, http://www.kubatana.net/htmiarchivelopin/060413jh.asp?speccode
("Service providers are going to have to bear the potentially extremely high capital and... costs
of the necessary hardware and software," along with "undertak[ing] the massive and expensive
task of obtaining detailed identification details for all their current and future clients").
8 Mugabe ProposesEavesdroppingLaw, MAIL& GUARDIAN (S. Aft.), May 27, 2006, http://
www.mg.co.za/article/2006-05-27-mugabe-proposes-eavesdropping-law.
89 ZIMB. CONST. ch. V, pt. 3, § 40B.
90 Id.
9' Id. ch. V, pt. 3, § 40A(3).
' Ray Matikinye, Media Groups Slam Communications Bill, ZIMB. INDEP., Aug. 25, 2006,
available at http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/media/060825zimind2.asp?spec_code=0604
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opposition from interest groups outside the government and the PLC, the
government withdrew the bill.93 Thus, for almost seven months, the
government allowed the bill to be reviewed by the public and allowed a
committee of Parliament to review and ultimately reject the bill.
The government, however, quickly submitted a new bill that was essentially
the same as the old one.94 The Zimbabwe Chapter of the Media Institute of
Southern Africa, a government watchdog group,95 condemned the redrafted bill
for being almost identical to the old bill,96 and noted that according to the
Chairman of the PLC, the government had already undertaken to make further
amendments to the new legislation.97
However, in spite of the opposition, the bill was passed by the House of
Assembly on May 13, 2007.98 An MDC politician mounted a final spirited
attack on the unconstitutionality of the bill during the floor debate, arguing that
the judiciary and not the Attorney General should be issuing warrants for the
surveillance of Zimbabwean citizens.99
A comparison of the FAA and the ICA illuminates concrete similarities,
disturbing common shortcomings, and real differences that make the FAA
more palatable than the ICA. But before reviewing the laws, it is necessary to
discuss the constitutional history and framework of each country to understand
the competing institutional and political factors that gave rise to the FAA and
ICA.
26commdex&sector=INFTEC&year2006&range_start=-1&intMainYear%/o20=%/o202006&intTo
dayYear%/o20=-%202007.
93 Clemence Manyukwe, Government Withdraws Snooping Bill, ZIM. INDEP., Nov. 3,2006,
available at http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/inftec/061103zniindl .asp?spec-code=0604
26commdex&sectoI-INFTEC&year=2006&range start-1&intainYear/o20=%202006&int
TodayYear/o20=%202007.
14 See State Resubmits Interception Bill, HERALD (Hararer, Zimb.), Nov. 8, 2006, available
athttp://www.kubatana.net/htmarchive/inftec/061108heraldl.asp?sector=legisl&year=2006&r
ang start=-I (describing the new bill as a consolidation of the first).
9' Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe Chapter, http://www.kubatana.net/html/
sectors/med002.asp?sector=MEDIA&year=0&rangestart=-1 (last visited May 29, 2009).
96 Cf Media Institute of Southern Africa, Revised Spying Bill Fails Test, KuBATANA,
Apr. 27, 2007, http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/media/070427misaz.asp?spec c (stating
"the revised version remains a retrogressive and repressive piece of legislation").
97 Id.
98 Media Institute of Southern Africa, Parliament Passes Spying Bill, KUBATANA, available
at http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/media/070614misaz.asp?spec_c.
99 Id.
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C. Constitutional History and Structure of the United States
The central feature of U.S. government structure is the concept of the
separation of powers, which is supposed to facilitate the checking and
balancing of power among the branches." Power is dispersed among three
equal branches of government: the Legislature, the Executive and the
Judiciary.'0 ' Each branch has certain powers that are intended to be used as a
check on the possible over-exercise of powers by a coordinate branch in order
to maintain balance among the branches and prevent any one branch from
accruing power at the expense of the other two.'0 2
The Legislative Branch consists of a bicameral legislature composed of the
House of Representatives, chosen by voters in proportion to their state's
population, and the Senate composed of two members from each state.'0 3
Congress is given the power to declare war, create and maintain armies and a
navy, and to organize militias to maintain order." It has the sole authority to
make laws.0 5
The Executive Branch consists of a singular President who is nationally
elected. 6 Like Congress, the President is endowed with some authority in the
conduct of foreign affairs: the President is the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, has the power to make treaties (with the advice and consent
of the Senate), and is given the authority to appoint ambassadors.17
The third branch of the federal government, the Judiciary, consists of one
constitutionally required court, the Supreme Court, and "such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."'08 The most
significant power of the Supreme Court is the power ofjudicial review, which
gives the Court the final authority to review the constitutionality of presidential
actions and laws passed by Congress.'0 9
100 TuE FEDERALIST No. 47, annot. lines 4-11 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
0' See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (outlining the powers of each branch of U.S. government).
02 For instance, the power to create law is given exclusively to Congress. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
(stating that Congress can "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper"). Yet the
President has sole authority to execute those laws and the Judiciary interprets the laws. Id. art.
II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
103 Id. art. I, §§ 2-3.
1 4 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
105 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
106 Id. art. II, § 1.
107 Id. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2.
08 Id. art. III, § 1.
1 0 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
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The flexibility of the language in the Constitution and the overlapping
spheres of authority given to Congress and the President have sometimes made
the conduct of foreign affairs a battle between the two political branches." 0
In the landmark case of United States v. US. District Court for the Eastern
District ofMichigan, Southern Division, the Court held that the President was
required by the Fourth Amendment and Title II to obtain a warrant from the
judicial branch before he could eavesdrop on domestic targets."' The Court
was careful, however, to make clear that its decision did not encompass
executive surveillance of "foreign powers or their agents."' 2
The Supreme Court has also ruled on the limits of executive power, most
notably in the Steel Seizure Case."' In that case, President Truman seized
control of private steel mills for national security reasons, as the continued
production of steel was essential to weaponry production. "4 The Court struck
down the executive action, finding that no statute passed by Congress and no
language in the Constitution could be construed to give the Executive the
power to seize control of domestic steel mills." 5
Thus, each of the three branches of the United States government is
intended to check the exercise of power of the other branches. Like the United
States, Zimbabwe has a constitutional system based upon the fundamental
principle of the separation of powers.
D. Constitutional History and Structure of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe's constitution embraces the principles of the separation of
powers and checks and balances, dividing power among Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial Branches." 6 The Executive Branch includes several
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.").
o See infra notes 11 1-15 and accompanying text (discussing examples of conflicts between
these two branches).
... United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Eastern Dist. of Mich., Southern Div., 407
U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
112 Id.
"' See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Steel Seizure Case and its
holding with respect to executive power).
114 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
115 Id. at 585-90.
116 See generally ZIMB. CONST. chs. IV, V, VIII (establishing the powers and duties of the
Executive, Parliament, and the Judiciary).
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lower constitutional officers whose function is to carry out official executive
acts; however, the President is designated as the Commander in Chief 7 and
has the sole authority under the constitution to declare war and make peace." 8
The constitution immunizes a range of presidential actions from
prosecution by declaring them to be nonjusticiable, including a blanket
protection of executive privilege, extending to the point that no court can
inquire into the nature of any consultations that the President undertakes or
whether the manner in which he has exercised any of his discretionary powers
under the constitution is in accordance with the law." 9
The Legislative Branch is composed of a bicameral Parliament consisting
of a Senate and House of Assembly. 2 The constitution gives Parliament a
broad grant of legislative power, giving it the authority to "make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Zimbabwe."' 2'
Despite this seemingly broad grant of authority, Parliament has not been
able to act as an important check on the Executive because its powers have
frequently been altered by constitutional amendments.'22 In a study of the
constitutions of Africa, one commentator divided constitutions into three
categories based on the ease with which they could be amended: flexible, semi-
flexible, and semi-rigid. 3 The Zimbabwe constitution is a "flexible"
constitution that allows for changes to be made to it with a simple two-thirds
majority in both the House of Assembly and the Senate.'24 The constitution's
flexibility, combined with the electoral dominance of the ZANU-PF and
Mugabe, has allowed Mugabe to rollback democratic elements of the
constitution to consolidate and extend his power.
125
117 Id. ch. IV, pt. 1, § 27(1).
118 Id. ch. IV, pt. 3, § 31H(4)(d).
119 Id. ch. IV, pt. 3, § 31K(l)(a)-(d); see also Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political
Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 14 (2007)
(comparing the powers of the Zimbabwean executive to that of a king).
120 ZIMB. CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, § 33.
121 Id. ch. V, pt. 5, § 50.
122 See CHIKUHWA, supra note 56, at 36-49 (describing various amendments to the
Constitution of Zimbabwe and their effect on the three branches of government).
123 Fombad, supra note 119, at 21.
124 ZMB. CONST. ch. V, pt. 5, § 52(3). But see U.S. CONST. art. V (laying out two methods
for constitutional amendment, one of which requires two-thirds majority in the House and Senate
and three-fourths approval by the state governments).
2S See CnKuHwA, supra note 56, at 160-63 (discussing the dominance of the ZANU-PF and
President Mugabe's expansion of the presidential cabinet).
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The third constitutional branch of the Zimbabwean government is the
Judiciary. The constitution establishes a Supreme Court, which is the court of
final appeal, 6 and a High Court, whose jurisdiction is determined by Act of
Parliament.'27 The constitution gives Parliament the power to create inferior
courts.128
In their basic theoretical structures, the constitutions of the United States
and Zimbabwe have very similar foundations: tripartite forms of government
designed to limit the power of government through the separation of powers
and the theory of checks and balances. The two nations not only share similar
theories of government but have also seen similarities in practice arise in the
enactment of the FAA and ISA.
1I1. THE FAA AND THE ICA
The FAA and the ICA were enacted in order to give the Executive Branch
increased legal authority to engage in electronic surveillance for national
security purposes. 2 9 The two laws differ in some fundamental regards, share
both positive and negative aspects, and, although they both give the Executive
Branch increased power with minimal checks from the Legislative and Judicial
Branches, the FAA does a better job of restraining the exercise of executive
power.
A. The Basics of the FAA and the ICA
The FAA and ICA, while sharing the common goal of increasing the
Executive Branch's ability to electronically eavesdrop for national security
purposes, have several basic differences in terms of their scope and the degree
of particularity used in describing that scope. In the United States, the FAA
sets new requirements for surveillance of three broad categories of targets: (1)
"persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" who are
not United States persons; 30 (2) "persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States" whose communications pass through the United
126 ZIMB. CONST. ch. VIII, § 80(1).
127 Id. ch. VIII, § 81(1).
121 Id. ch. VIII, § 79(1)(c).
129 See supra Parts II, II.B (discussing the events leading to the enactment of these laws and
their respective purposes).
130 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(d)(1)(A) (2008). "United States person" is defined at 50
U.S.C.A. § 1801(i).
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States;' 3' and (3) United States "persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States."' 32 The FAA gives the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), two members of the
Executive Branch, the authority to acquire foreign intelligence information
relating to people reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
for up to one year if the FISA court authorizes it.'33 "Foreign intelligence
information" broadly includes, among other things, information that relates to
the ability of the United States to protect against "potential attack or other
grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"'34 and
information "with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to... the national defense or the security of the United States; or the conduct
of the foreign affairs of the United States."'
135
In order to receive authorization to engage in electronic surveillance, the
DNI or AG has to issue a certification (an application for surveillance) to the
FISA court which attests that (1) the targeted person is reasonably believed to
be outside the United States; (2) minimization procedures 36 have been adopted
that will prevent the retention of information relating to non-targeted persons
or United States persons; (3) guidelines have been put in place to prevent the
intentional targeting of a United States person; (4) these targeting,
minimization, and guidelines are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; and
(5) a significant purpose of the surveillance is to acquire foreign intelligence
information. 37 The FISA court reviews the certification to make sure that the
above standards have been complied with, the surveillance is targeted at non-
United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, and
appropriate minimization procedures have been adopted and applied.'
The ICA seemingly gives the Executive Branch of Zimbabwe the expansive
power to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of all persons within the
country if the government has a warrant. 3 9  The official charged with
131 See id. § 1881 b(a)(1) (emphasizing that the acquisition of the communication must be
within the United States).
132 Id. § 1881c(a)(2). For all other foreign intelligence surveillance, such as surveillance of
persons within the United States, the pre-FAA FISA requirements codified at 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801 et seq. still apply.
3 Id. § 1881a(a).
, Id. § 1801(e)(1)(A).
3 Id. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B).
136 Id. § 1801(h).
117 Id. § 1881 a(g)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
138 Id. § 1881a(i)(2)(A)-(C).
139 Interception of Communications Act, pt. II, § 3(l)(a)(iii) (2007) (Zimb.), available at
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enforcing the law is the Minister of Transport and Communication,"' an
Executive Branch official. Four law enforcement officials, the Chief of
Defense Intelligence, the Director-General of the President's department
responsible for national security, the Commissioner of the Zimbabwe Republic
Police, and the Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority,
have the authority to apply for a surveillance warrant.' The application for
a surveillance warrant must specify the person targeted, the
telecommunications service provider that will assist with the surveillance, the
location of the telecommunications facilities that will be utilized to conduct the
surveillance, and all the facts that support the need for surveillance.'42
The warrant will be issued if the Minister determines that there are
"reasonable grounds" to believe that, among other things, the surveillance is
necessary to gather information relating to either "an actual threat to the
national security or to any compelling national economic interest" or "a
potential threat to public safety or national security."'143 The warrant is
required to specify the name and address of the targeted person, the manner by
which the government will conduct the surveillance, and the method by which
the government will identify the communications that need to be targeted.'"
The FAA and ICA share the same basic framework and purpose, giving the
Executive Branch increased surveillance powers, although it should be noted
http://kubatana.net/docs/legisl/ica_070803.pdf. The Act also requires telecommunication service
providers to obtain sufficient information about its customers before entering a contract so that
it can comply with the Act, if needed to. Id. pt. III, § 10(1). A customer is "any person, body
or organisation which has entered into a contract with the service provider for the provision of
a telecommunication service." Id. pt. I, § (2)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, it seems that
telecommunication service providers must keep track of each of its customers and be able to
provide the Executive, if the government has a warrant, the information and identity of the
customer. Moreover, it is lawful for a party to a communication to intercept the communication.
Id. pt. II, § 3(1)(a)(i). A party, "in relation to a telecommunication, means a person whose access
to the communication is or might reasonably be known by all other parties." Id. pt. I, § (2)(1)
(emphasis added). Here too, it seems that parties to a communication have a carte blanche to
intercept the private communication between them and other parties.
'4 See id. pt. I, § 2(2) (defining "Minister" as "the Minister of Transport and Communication
or any other Minister to whom the President may from time to time assign the administration of
this Act"); see also id. pt. III, § 5(2) (providing that a warrant application must be made to the
Minister).
' Id. pt. III, § 5(1).
142 Id. pt. III, § 5(3)(a)-(h).
141 Id. pt. III, § 6(1)(b)-(c). National security of Zimbabwe is defined as "matters relating to
the existence, independence and safety of the State." Id. pt. I, § 2(1).
1- Id. pt. III, § 7(1)(b), (d).
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that the ICA goes much further than the FAA in targeting the communications
of all persons within Zimbabwe, regardless of with whom the in-country target
is speaking. But both laws attempt to put meaningful limits on the exercise of
surveillance power by including provisions that provide for penalties for
failing to follow the law.
B. Common Characteristics of the FAA and ICA that Limit the Surveillance
Power
The FAA and ICA limit the exercise of the surveillance power by including
provisions that make the laws the exclusive means through which surveillance
may be conducted, provide criminal punishment for breaking the law, and put
a time limit on any surveillance authorizations.
The FAA and ICA both provide that they are the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted and they both criminally punish
violators. The FAA includes an unequivocal provision stating "this [Act] shall
be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception
of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be conducted.
'
"
145
Any violation of the FAA, i.e., surveillance conducted outside the limits set up
by FISA and FAA, 46 is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, up to a five year
imprisonment, or both. 47 The ICA has a similar exclusivity provision 14 and
provides for monetary punishments and imprisonment for any violations.
149
The ICA also limits any warrant issued to a period of three months, after
which the government official who requested it may seek a three month
extension for "good cause."15 The FAA allows for surveillance for up to one
full year before the AG or DNI must return to the FISA court to get a renewed
14' 50 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (2008).
' See id. § 1809(a)(1) (stating "A person is guilty if an offense of he intentionally engages
in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by [statute]").
147 Id. § 1809(c).
148 See Interception of Communications Act, pt. II, § 3(1)(a)(iii) (stating "no person shall
intercept any communication in the course of its transmission by means of a telecommunication
system or radiocommunication system unless he or she is authorized by warrant"). Interceptions
may also be made if he is a party to the communication or has the consent "of the person to
whom, or the person by whom, the communication is sent .. " Id. pt. II, § 3(1)(a)(i)-(ii).
149 See id. pt. II, § 3(3) (stating that any surveillance conducted outside the law is "liable to
a fine... or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such fine and such
imprisonment").
iso Id. pt. III, § 7(l)(a)(i)-(ii).
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authorization.'' Limiting the amount of time that surveillance can occur
before new authorization is required is important because it forces frequent
evaluations of the targets of the surveillance and prevents excessive
surveillance. The ICA's shorter authorization is preferable because it increases
accountability by forcing more frequent reevaluations and applications.
Despite these shared strengths, however, the FAA and ICA share several
common shortcomings.
C. Common Shortcomings of the FAA and ICA
The FAA and the ICA both rely to a disturbing degree on the cooperation
of private telecommunications companies for enforcement. The FAA permits
the AG or DNI, after securing authorization from the FISA Court, to direct an
electronic communication service provider (ECSP) to "immediately provide
the Government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to
accomplish" the eavesdropping.'52 ESCPs are compensated by the government
for their assistance and are released from any civil or criminal liability for
assisting the government pursuant to a government directive.'
The ICA goes even further in enmeshing private telecommunications
companies in government surveillance by requiring them to "install[ ]
hardware and software facilities and devices to enable interception of
communications at all times or when so required" and make sure that the
surveillance equipment is capable of providing real-time monitoring, as well
as other technological requirements."5 Furthermore, although ECSPs are to
be paid by the government for the use of personnel and administrative costs for
the surveillance,' 55 the ECSPs are expected to provide and install the
surveillance equipment at their own cost.'56 Both of these laws create systems
whereby private corporations and public governmental entities (the intelligence
agencies) engage in consortium-like behavior, blurring the line between
1 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(a) (2008).
152 Id. § 1881a(h)(1)(A).
153 Id § 1881a(h)(2)-(3).
"54 Interception of Communications Act, pt. III, § 9(1)(a)-(h).
155 Id. pt. III, § 13(4).
156 Id. pt. III, § 12(4)-(5); see also Lance Gurna, Too Much to Monitorfor Snooping Squads,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Aug. 7, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200708071061 .html (noting that this
could be financially devastating for some internet service providers).
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government coercion and free enterprise, and make dispassionate
governmental oversight of the surveillance activities very difficult.1
57
An equally alarming aspect of both laws is the wide amount of discretion
given to each government in choosing the targets of surveillance. The ICA
seems to allow any person within Zimbabwe, regardless of citizenship, to be
the target of surveillance. 5 8 It draws no distinctions between citizens of
Zimbabwe and non-citizens. Unlike FISA and the FAA, the ICA draws no
distinctions between international communications routed through Zimbabwe,
foreign-to-foreign calls routed through Zimbabwe, and purely domestic
communications, giving the government blanket authority to eavesdrop on all
communications.
Similar concerns, although not as blatant as the ICA, can be raised about
the targeting guidelines of the FAA. Under the pre-FAA FISA requirements,
which still apply to all communications other than the three broad types
targeted by the FAA, 159 the executive had to specify "the identity, if known, or
a description of the specific target of the electronic surveillance." 6' The new
standards, however, do not focus on the specific communications to be
targeted, like an e-mail account or phone number, but only the physical
location of the person being targeted. 6' Conceivably it would allow for the
monitoring of all electronic communications a person makes (phone, e-mail,
or fax) so long as the government has a reasonable belief that the person is
outside the United States. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in conducting
such open-ended surveillance in close concert with private companies, both the
United States and Zimbabwe have attempted to limit the use of the executive
surveillance power by placing judicial and legislative checks on its exercise.
157 See Glenn Greenwald, Telecom Amnesty Would Forever Foreclose Investigation of Vital
Issues, SALON, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/10/15/amnesty/
(describing these corporations and government agencies as forming a consortium with "no
governmental oversight or regulation").
' See supra note 139 (explaining definitions of "customer" and "party" in ICA).
'19 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing the surveillance subjects).
1 6 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(2) (2008).
16. See id. § 1881 a(d)(1)(A) ("The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence, shall adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that
any acquisition... is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States."). See also id. § 1881b(b)(1)(C)(I), c(b)(3)(A) (stating the same targeting
requirements).
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D. Limits Placed on the Surveillance Power Through Judicial and Legislative
Checks and Balances
The United States and Zimbabwe have both attempted to place limits on
executive surveillance through judicial and legislative checks. Although it is
lacking in some respects, the United States has done a far better job than
Zimbabwe by placing a more effective judicial review check and a legislative
oversight check on the exercise of the surveillance power by the Executive.
1. Judicial Checks in the FAA and ICA
The judicial check provided by the FAA, although weakened by certain
provisions of the FAA, is stronger than the judicial check included in the ICA.
The scope of the judicial review conducted by the FISA court has been
changed by the FAA. In the original FISA statute, before any surveillance
could begin, the FISA court had to find that there was probable cause that the
target was a foreign agent or a foreign power; the facilities or locations to be
surveilled were being used, or about to be used, by a foreign agent or foreign
power; the minimization procedures passed the statutory requirements; and the
certification met the requirements of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804.162 Under the new
FAA guidelines, the FISA court continues to evaluate the minimization
procedures but makes no probable cause determinations; instead, it merely
reviews the authorization to ensure that the targeted persons are reasonably
believed to be outside the United States,'63 a standard far below probable
cause, thus diminishing the effectiveness of judicial oversight.
Furthermore, the original FISA guidelines provided persons who had been
improperly surveilled by the government with a civil cause of action, entitling
them to recover damages and attorney's fees.&" However, a controversial new
provision in the FAA greatly reduced the effectiveness of judicial review of
executive surveillance by providing retroactive immunity from lawsuit for
ECSPs that provided assistance with the TSP.'65
Although the judicial oversight provided by the FAA is minimal, the ICA
provides even less judicial oversight. There is no judicial review of the
application for surveillance submitted to the Minister of Transportation and
162 Id. § 1805(a).
3 d. § 188la(i)(2)(A)-(C).
6"Id. § 1810.
165 Id. § 1885a(a)(4)(A)(i).
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Communication prior to the commencement of surveillance. The ICA does,
however, give "aggrieved" persons a cause of action to challenge the
surveillance order and win "costs" if the court finds them appropriate." The
lack of mandatory judicial review on the front end and the ambiguous grant of
a cause of action to challenge a surveillance order on the back end fail to
supply any meaningful judicial check or balance to the administration of the
ICA.
In keeping with the need for checks and balances, both the FAA and ICA
provide a legislative check on the exercise of executive wiretapping power.
The FAA provides a much stronger legislative check than the ICA.
2. Legislative Checks in the FAA and ICA
The FAA provides for a much stronger legislative check than the ICA
because of its extensive reporting requirements. Once every six months, the
AG and DNI are required to assess their compliance with targeting and
minimization procedures and submit a report to Congress.'67 The Inspectors
General of the Department of Justice and the intelligence community'68 are
also required to submit a bi-annual report to Congress that identifies the
number of "disseminated intelligence reports" '169 that contain references to
United States persons.'70 None of these reporting requirements require that the
intelligence gatherers reveal the identity or name of the United States persons
who were actually surveilled.
An entire new code section, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881, entitled "Congressional
Oversight," allows Congress to see the certifications submitted by the
intelligence agencies 7 '-the certifications only have to show that the target of
the surveillance is reasonably believed to be outside of the United States.'
But that does not provide disclosure of potentially targeted United States
16 Interception of Communications Act, pt. V, § 18(l)-(2) (2007) (Zimb.).
167 50 U.S.C.A. § 188 1a(l)(1).
168 See id. § 401a(4) (defining the term "intelligence community").
169 Id. § 188 la(l)(2)(B). "Disseminated intelligence reports" is not defined in the statute but
it can be assumed to mean intelligence reports that are actually distributed to intelligence agents,
which would seem to mean that a lot of intelligence gathered under the law may not be reported
to Congress.
170 Id. § 1881a(l)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
171 Id § 1881f(b)(1)(A).
171 Id § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i)(I).
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persons who are in the United States and on the other end of a communication
with a targeted person.
Lastly, the AG is required to disclose any decisions, orders, or opinions of
the FISA Court or FISA Court of Review that contain significant
interpretations of FISA,'73 including decisions made from 2003 onwards.'74
The disclosure of these opinions is neutered, however, by giving the AG the
power to redact material "necessary to protect the security of the United
States,""' which gives the AG the unilateral power to control the information
given to Congress.
Strikingly, the ICA provides for virtually no oversight by the Legislative
Branch of the Zimbabwean government. The administering Minister is
required to submit an annual report to the Attorney General that includes "a
written summary of the particulars of every warrant" issued by the Minister
during that calendar year.'76 No specific information is required to be included
in the report, leaving the Attorney General with broad discretion. Furthermore,
the Attorney General is the "principal legal adviser to the Government" and is
appointed by the President.'77 The Attorney General has no constitutional
responsibility to act as a check on the exercise of executive power. The law,
by giving the Attorney General the sole ability to review acts of surveillance
committed pursuant to this law, has given the Executive the power to intercept
any communications it thinks may endanger national security with no
legislative oversight.
The foregoing analysis of the FAA and ICA has discussed the controversial
and potentially far-reaching surveillance powers included in both laws and
efforts to curb the increase in executive power by inserting judicial and
legislative checks and balances.
Both Zimbabwe and the United States are at critical junctures politically
and institutionally. Political developments in both countries offer the
opportunity to correct current imbalances in power but the prospect of real
change depends not just on partisan politics but a reinvigoration of the
institutions of government and their commitment to the separation of powers.
' Id. § 1871(c)(1)-(2).
174 Id.
17 Id. § 1871(d).
176 Interception of Communications Act, pt. V, § 19(1) (2007) (Zimb.).
177 ZDAB. CONST., ch. VII, § 76(1)-(2).
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IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE
Zimbabwe and the United States have both held recent executive and
legislative elections that resulted in victories for political parties that have
challenged many of the current imbalances in power. In the United States, the
November 2008 election of Democrat Barack Obama, a harsh critic of the
Bush Administration and former member of the Legislative Branch as a United
States Senator, 7 ' would seem to portend a change in the executive's push for
ever-greater power. In Zimbabwe, the March 2008 presidential election was
marred by a delayed release of vote totals and a prolonged power-sharing
dispute between the two highest vote-getters, Tsvangirai and Mugabe. 79
Although these developments are promising, the best opportunity for change
in both countries lies not with the ideological differences between the old and
new political leaders but with an institutional reinvigoration of the power of
each branch of government to check the others.
A. Zimbabwe
The power to undo the damage done by the passage of the ICA lies with
any of the three branches of the Zimbabwean government. Change is most
likely to come from either the Legislative or Judicial Branch.
Nonetheless, recent developments in Zimbabwe have increased the
opportunity for the Executive Branch to lead the way in repealing the ICA and
other repressive laws. The March 29,2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe
seemed to indicate a dramatic changing of the guard, as early, non-official
returns showed a victory for Tsvangirai over Mugabe.180 But the Electoral
Commission delayed the release of the official results for over a month before
finally revealing that Tsvangirai had captured 47.9%, Mugabe 43.2%, and a
third-party challenger, a breakaway group of ZANU-PF dissidents, 8.3%,
necessitating a runoff between Tsvangirai and Mugabe.18 ' However, after
months of intimidation and brutal beatings of his supporters, Tsvangirai
8 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
18o See Zimbabwe Opposition Says It Has Beaten Mugabe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2008, at A6
("Zimbabwe's main opposition party said Sunday that it had won a landslide victory, insisting
that unofficial election results showed that the [MDC] had unseated President Robert G.
Mugabe, the man who has led this nation for 28 years.").
181 Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Calls for Runoff, but Opposition Challenges Vote Count,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2008, at A10.
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withdrew from the runoff just before it was to occur due to doubts about its
integrity caused by the intimidation and persecution meted out by supporters
of Mugabe.8 2  Even though Mugabe won the one-candidate runoff,
international pressure and mediation efforts by the President of South Africa,
Thabo Mbeki, resulted in a groundbreaking power-sharing agreement among
Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and the ZANU-PF breakaway group that called for a
coalition government of all three groups and, more importantly, a new
constitution."' In late January 2009, Tsvangirai finally agreed to join
Mugabe's government as prime minister in the hope of forming a government
that would end the repressive policies of Mugabe and open up Zimbabwe to
international humanitarian aid."8 4 More important than the struggling for the
presidency, however, are the results of the March parliamentary elections and
the possibilities for reform that may come as a result.
While the focus of the international community and most of Zimbabwe has
been on the battle for the presidency, control of Parliament has unquestionably
changed hands and could be the key to restoring the institutional balance of
power. The MDC captured a narrow victory in the March elections,
winning one hundred seats to the ZANU-PF's ninety-nine, with the ZANU-PF
breakaway faction holding ten.'85 After winning the uncontested runoff,
Mugabe convened Parliament and forced them to elect a Speaker in the hopes
of pressuring its members to elect a Speaker supportive of Mugabe." 6 The
plan backfired when the MDC and the ZANU-PF breakaway group combined
to elect Lovemore Moyo, the candidate of the MDC caucus, as Speaker.'87 In
his acceptance speech, Moyo declared" 'Parliament will cease to be a rubber-
stamping house .... It'll ensure that progressive laws are passed.' "188
182 Celia W. Dugger & Barry Bearak, Mugabe Rival Quits Runoff, Citing Attacks, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 2008, at Al.
183 See Graham Bowley & Alan Cowell, In Sharp Departure, Zimbabwe Rivals Meet in Bid
to End Political Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 2008, at A6 (reporting "[i]n the agreement, which
was also signed by a separate opposition fraction, the sides pledged to seek a new government
of national unity and a new constitution").
184 Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Opposition to Join Government After Months of Pressure,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2009, at A8.
185 See Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Opposition, Now a Power in Parliament, Wins a Top
Job, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,2008, at A6 (reporting on the MDC's victory and stating "[i]f united
with its splinter faction, which has 10 seats in Parliament, the [MDC] controls 110 votes to 99
for Mr. Mugabe's governing party, ZANU-PF").
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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The selection of a leader in Parliament who is opposed to Mugabe's
repressive policies is an important victory in the struggle to establish limits on
the abuse of executive power. However, as the United States has shown,
divided control of the Legislative and Executive Branches does not necessarily
signal the imposition of meaningful limits on executive surveillance powers.
It requires support from a free press, principled political leadership, and
support from the third branch of government, the Judiciary.
The Zimbabwean courts also seem capable of reversing the damage done
by the ICA. The Zimbabwe Supreme Court has already struck down a
similarly repressive measure enacted by Parliament and signed by Mugabe into
law."89 The judges of Zimbabwe, particularly those on the Supreme Court,
have maintained a high degree of professionalism and independence. 9 If the
newly elected Speaker of Parliament and his MDC majority are unable to
curtail executive surveillance, the courts of Zimbabwe have the power to
restore order through adherence to separation of powers principles.
B. The United States
Like Zimbabwe, the United States is at an important crossroads. While any
of the three branches of government could correct the problems created by the
FAA, the best opportunity for reform are more assertive Legislative and
Judicial Branches.
The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States was hailed
as a repudiation of the Bush Administration and its policies. 9 ' But President
Obama has not held a consistent position on the issue of executive surveillance
for national security purposes.'9 2 After initially opposing the PAA and vowing
to try and stop the passage of any legislation that gave ESCPs immunity while
running for the Democratic nomination for president, Obama changed his
,89 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
,9 Fombad, supra note 119, at 17 ("[D]espite immense pressure and severe resource
constraints, an underlying professionalism remains noticeable in many judgments, especially
from the High Court." (quoting LINDA VAN DE VrvJE, THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
RIGHTS UNIT, UCT STUDY; THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 160-86 (2006))).
... Adam Nagoumey, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4,2008, at Al.
'92 James Risen, Obama Voters Protest His Switch on Telecom Immunity, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2008, at A14.
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position and supported the FAA, including its immunity provision.193 While
it remains to be seen how Obama will govern as president, it is very unlikely
that he will voluntarily abdicate the presidential powers that have accrued
during the Bush years unless either the Legislative or Judicial Branches force
their surrender. Indeed, as of the final editing of this Note, the Obama
Administration has not rolled back all of the most controversial policies of the
Bush Administration. 194
The Democratic Party emerged from the November 4, 2008 national
elections with large majorities in both the House and the Senate.' 95 However,
the same leadership that passed the FAA remains in place, and it seems very
unlikely that they would strip a Democratic president of wiretapping powers
out of a fear of appearing soft on terrorism. If the Democrats in Congress,
however, were to decide to act, they should pass legislation that requires the
FISA Court to review surveillance prior to its commencement, necessitates a
showing of probable cause, and requires that the target of the surveillance is
an agent of a foreign power. Furthermore, any future legislation should
provide for even greater oversight by Congress, including full disclosure of all
Americans who are intentionally or unintentionally surveilled. Since it is
unlikely that a Democratic president and Congress will willingly surrender the
powers contained in the FAA, the federal judiciary is the best hope for
restoring checks and balances.
The passage of the FAA was met with immediate court challenges by
private litigants and civil liberties groups. The ACLU sued in federal court,
alleging that the FAA is an unconstitutional abridgement of the First and
Fourth Amendments and a violation of the separation ofpowers. 96 Also, after
its lawsuits against the ESCPs were effectively terminated by the FAA,' 97 the
Electronic Frontier Foundation sued President Bush and the NSA for allegedly
193 Id.
194 Charlie Savage, Obama's War on Terror May Resemble Bush's in Some Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A20 (noting that while President Obama signed orders that will
eventually close CIA secret prisons, the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and ended military
commission trials, he endorsed the Bush Administration's expansive use of the state secrets
doctrine and the continued use of extraordinary rendition).
115 David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Democrats in Congress Vowing to Pursue An
Aggressive Agenda, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al.
196 Complaint at 3, Amnesty International v. McConnell, No. 08 CIV 6259 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
2008 WL 2773811.
'9' 50 U.S.C. § 1885a(a)(4) (2008) (All civil actions pending against the government "shall
be promptly dismissed" if the AG certifies the wiretapping was an intelligence activity authorized
by the President).
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
engaging in illegal, warrantless wiretapping. 9 ' The Supreme Court has
intervened in the past to correct prior imbalances in the separation of
powers,199 and it once again may have the final say as to the constitutionality
of executive action and the separation of powers.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the recent developments surrounding the passage
of new intelligence-gathering laws in Zimbabwe and the United States. It has
looked at events in both countries that led to the perceived need for enhanced
surveillance laws and the background constitutional structures and histories
upon which these new laws have been grafted. Lastly, it evaluated the checks
and balances placed in each law and possibilities for the future.
The animating feature behind this comparison has been to consider whether
the United States, in this limited area of law, can be compared to a country in
a state of severe economic and political distress. The comparison, as noted at
the outset, was attenuated by the very real differences in history, political
culture, and international setting between the two countries. But these basic
differences namely, Zimbabwe's standing as a third-world, sub-Saharan
country only recently liberated from British colonialism and the United States'
standing as the most powerful and influential democracy in the world, make
the few similarities between what has occurred in recent years all the more
striking.
Cataclysmic events caused both countries to enact far-reaching surveillance
laws that seriously erode civil liberties. In the United States, the attacks of
September 11, 2001 have been the impetus for an increase in the power of the
executive to surveil citizens and non-citizens alike. In Zimbabwe, the
perceived unfairness of the racial disparities in land ownership caused an ill-
conceived and poorly implemented land redistribution scheme, which plunged
Zimbabwe into a severe state of distress. This crisis became the reason for the
government's increased surveillance of its citizenry, to save its citizens from
themselves and outside threats.
But the most striking similarity that arises from this comparison is the
acquiescence of the Legislative Branches to these executive demands for more
'98 Scott Shane, Agency and Bush Are Sued over Domestic Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2008, at A13.
'" See discussion, supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. District Court
v. Eastern Michigan and the Steel Seizure Case).
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power. Instead of checking the power of the Executive by conducting
oversight, demanding access to information, and informing the public of the
actions of its government, the national legislatures in Zimbabwe and the
United States acted like a rubber stamp for the Executive. The Judicial
Branches in both countries are limited by the fact that they must wait for
litigants to present a case for them to decide before they can pass on the
constitutionality of a law and have not had the opportunity to do so.
The necessary change that needs to take place in both countries is a
reinvigoration of the Legislative Branch. James Madison wrote that "the great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments
of the others."2" Legislators in the United States and Zimbabwe have the
constitutional means to limit executive power. More of them need the personal
courage to do so.
200 FEDERAUST No. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole, ed., 2005).
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